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People v. Perez
Misapplication of the Right to Counsel
I. INTRODUCTION
People v. Perez represents the strongest attack against the use
of law students in the judicial process since the inception of
Clinical Law in 1957.1 If this decision is given its fullest interpre-
tation, it will demote California law students to passive onlookers
in their respective clinical law programs. In its most diluted form,
it will effectively prohibit any law student from participation in
criminal defense.
The case, in terms of actual analysis, may be viewed as a bal-
ancing between a criminal defendant's right to the effective assist-
ance of counsel and the interest of society in having an educated
and well-trained bar. Alternatively, the case may be viewed as an
instance where a court applied an improper standard and stretch-
ed the facts to fit that erroneous rule.
This note will demonstrate how this decision has departed from
both well-considered public policy and a long line of case prece-
dents. Initially, however, a discussion of the facts and an analysis
of the Perez decision will be made, along with a general explora-
tion of the right to counsel.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Carlos Perez was convicted of second-degree burglary,2 a fel-
ony, by a jury in a superior court of the State of California. Police
officers, after hearing the sound of breaking glass, drove one block
in the direction of the disturbance and saw the defendant stand-
ing across the street from the shattered front door of Durago's
Men's Store in Calexico. Defendant was the only person observed
in the area and was walking briskly away from the scene of the
1. A formally recognized clinical law program began in Colorado in 1957.
Such programs proved to be so successful that within twenty years, forty-seven
states were involved in active law student participation in the courtroom. (Ne-
vada, Vermont and Rhode Island, having no law schools within their borders, are
the exceptions). COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
rrY, INC., SURVEY AND DIRECTORY OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION (1977-78).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West Supp. 1977).
crime. The officers stopped Mr. Perez and searched bags found in
his possession. Inside of both bags were several articles of cloth-
ing with price tags still affixed from Durago's Men's Store. Addi-
tionally, the officers observed several fresh scratches and glass
particles on Mr. Perez's forearms and hands.3 Mr. Perez testified
that the bags were not in his arms and that he had discovered
them on the sidewalk only moments before his apprehension. 4 To
quote the court of appeal: "The evidence of Perez's guilt, con-
servatively speaking, is overwhelming." 5
Mr. Edward Zinter, Deputy Public Defender, was appointed
counsel for Mr. Perez. Mr. Jack Loo, University of California, Los
Angeles, Law School graduate, then awaiting his Bar results,
joined Mr. Zinter in the defense as a certified law student.6 Mr.
Perez signed a consent form acknowledging Mr. Loo as part of his
defense team under the supervision of Mr. Zinter.7
After the jury had returned the guilty verdict, the trial judge
stated:
[A]nd in particular, in front of the jury, I would like to compliment Mr.
Loo, even though the defendant was convicted. Mr. Loo did what I con-
sider for a law student an outstanding job, and I thought it was a better
job than some I've seen with, you know, people who are full-fledged law-
yers.8
The case was successfully appealed by Ernest Bordunda, court
appointed counsel for Mr. Perez. The case attracted an amicus
curiae brief, from Loyola Law Clinics and McGeorge School of
Law along with the state's July 19, 1978 petition for rehearing 9 fol-
lowing the court of appeal's reversal that was originally an-
nounced on June 23, 1978.
The denial for rehearing precipitated a deluge of activity focus-
ing on the California Supreme Court. The court responded by va-
cating the court of appeal's judgment and granted a hearing'O and,
3. People v. Perez, 82 Cal. App. 3d 952, 955, 147 Cal. Rptr. 34, 36 (1978), hearing
granted, No. 78-121 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 16, 1978). On December 18, 1978, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court gave provisional approval to the State Bar request for ap-
proval of Rules Governing the Practical Training of Law Students and invited
comments on those rules until Feb. 1, 1979, shortly after which the court will take
final action. The authors' reasons are given as a probable indication of the court's
reasons for granting the request and also to point out other inconsistencies in the
court of appeal opinion.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 955, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
6. Since 1970, the State Bar has certified law students from ABA-approved
schools who have finished a minimum of one-half of the prerequisite number of
hours for graduation. Such law students may then receive practical training under
a supervising attorney. Infra note 83.
7. Supra note 5.
8. People v. Perez, 4 Crim. No. 8753, Record at 177, lines 15-17.
9. People v. Perez, 82 Cal. App. 3d 952, 147 Cal. Rptr. 40 (1978).
10. Hearing granted August 16, 1978.
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at the same time, invited amicus curiae from interested parties."
III. REASONING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
An analysis of the court of appeal decision indicates that the
conviction was overturned on the ground that there was a denial
of the right to counsel, compounded by a subsidiary, but impor-
tant, issue of the unauthorized practice of law. In order to arrive
at the finding of a sixth amendment violation, it is necessary to
lay the predicate that, first, Mr. Loo's participation was illegal and
that, second, Mr. Loo's activities precluded Mr. Zinter's represen-
tation in Mr. Perez's defense. It then becomes incumbent to ex-
amine the court of appeal's handling of the unauthorized practice
of law sub-issue, before dealing with the sixth amendment's guar-
antee of right to effective representation by counsel.
The court first determined that Mr. Loo's actions constituted
the practice of law.12 The court arrived at this conclusion by ad-
hering to the language in Smallberg v. State Bar,13 which held
that the representation of another before a tribunal is the very
heart of the practice of law. The court noted that comparatively,
Mr. Loo's activities were much closer to the practice of law than
were the activities of others who had been convicted under Cali-
fornia law.14 The court further indicated that no case or other au-
thority existed to support the contention that the use of a certified
law student, under the supervision of an attorney, was a proce-
dure permissible in California.' 5
The court then dismissed the state's contention that the "Rules
Governing the Practical Training of Law Students" adopted by
the State Bar were sufficient justification for Mr. Loo's activities
11. The Deans of the fifteen ABA-approved law schools retained the firm of
Beardsley, Hufstedler, and Kemple to draft and submit their amicus curiae.
Loyola Law Clinics, headed by Thomas Scully in conjunction with McGeorge
School of Law Clinic headed by Glendale Garfield also plan to submit an amicus
curiae brief.
12. 82 Cal. App. 3d at 962, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
13. 212 Cal. 113, 297 P. 96 (1931). People v. Merchant Protection Corp., 189 Cal.
531, 209 P. 363 (1922); In re Steven C., 9 Cal. App. 3d 255, 88 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1970).
14. Crawford v. State Bar, 54 Cal. 2d 659, 355 P.2d 490, 7 Cal. Rptr. 746 (1960)
(aiding disbarred attorney to conduct interview by practicing attorney, unlawful);
Farnham v. State Bar, 17 Cal. 3d 605, 552 P.2d 445, 131 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1976) (practic-
ing law while suspended); Bluestein v. State Bar, 13 Cal. 3d 162, 529 P.2d 599, 118
Cal. Rptr. 175 (1974) (aiding an unlicensed person in threatening to use criminal
process to collect alimony); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6126 (West 1939).
15. 82 Cal. App. 3d at 957, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 37 (1978). See also Supra note 95.
in the courtroom.1 6
The court held that it is inherently a judicial function to deter-
mine who is, or is not, admitted to the practice of law.17 It was
determined that while the legislature may properly empower the
State Bar to draft rules of conduct for the practicing attorney, it
had in this area exceeded the limits of its control and invaded the
province of the judiciary by promulgating authority allowing the
State Bar to authorize practice by certified law students.' 8 The
court viewed the legislature's entry into the realm of the judiciary
as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine19 and, thus,
found the trespass unconstitutional.20 The court found that Mr.
Loo's activities constituted the practice of law2 1 and that the au-
thority under which these activities took place had been unconsti-
tutionally extended to the State Bar by the legislature. Therefore,
Mr. Loo was without authority to practice law and was involved in
the unauthorized practice of law. 22
The preceding provided an outline of the sub-issue involving
the court's determination on unauthorized practice of law. Atten-
tion must now be shifted to the reversible error violation of the
sixth amendment right to effective counsel.
IV. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The right to counsel may be best understood after an examina-
tion of the development of that right. An overview of the history
and scope of that right will provide the basis for a clear under-
standing of the court of appeal opinion and of the state's opposi-
tion to the court's rationale.
V. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN FEDERAL
CRIMINAL PROCEEDING
A. The Right to Counsel in English and Early American Law
The right to counsel in early England was nonsensical, illogical
and injurious.23 Those prosecuted for lesser offenses had a very
16. The Rules were first issued in 1970 and were later amended on May 15,
1976. The Rules are currently before the California Supreme Court. Upon request
by the State Bar of California that their "Rules Governing the Practical Training of
Law Students" be approved, Bar Misc. No. 4089. As of the date of this article, they
have been provisionally approved. Supra note 95.
17. In re Lavine, 2 Cal. 2d 324, 41 P.2d 161 (1935); Brotsky v. State Bar, 57 Cal.
2d 287, 19 Cal. Rptr. 153, 368 P.2d 697, 94 A.L.R.2d 1310 (1962).
18. Supra note 9, at 960, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
19. Id. at 960, 962, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 37, 39.
20. Id. at 962, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
21. Id. at 957, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
22. Brydonjack v. State Bar, 208 Cal. 439, 443, 281 P. 1018, 1022 (1929).
23. For an excellent examination of the right to counsel in England and colo-
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broad right to representation by counsel.24 On the other hand,
those accused of felonies were not permitted to retain counsel.25
It was not until 193626 that those charged with felonies were given
virtually the same rights as those charged with misdemeanors.
nial America, see BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 8-24 (1955);
and 1 F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883).
24. In minor cases such as libel, perjury, battery, and conspiracy, the accused
was allowed the right to retain counsel and to be defended by him. BEANEY, supra
note 23, at 8; and STEPHEN, supra note 23, at 397-399.
25. Before 1695, one accused of robbery, larceny, or treason, had no right to be
represented even by retained counsel. BEANEY, supra note 23, at 9. In that year,
Parliament carved out an exception for treason or misprision thereof, requiring
the court to appoint counsel, not to exceed two, upon the request of the defendant.
7 and 8 W. 3, C.3, s.1 (1695). This statute, however, left other accused felons with-
out protection. Blackstone was critical of a system which protected those who
were accused of lesser offenses and did not generally protect those accused of
more grievous offenses, when he questions: "[Ulpon what face of reason can that
assistance . . . be denied to save the life of a man, which is yet allowed him in
prosecutions for every petty trespass?" He then observed that the judges them-
selves had been aware of this apparent irony, since they had permitted counsel to
argue both factual and legal issues. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
ENGLAND 355 (1795).
26. For an analysis of events leading up to the recognition of an absolute right
of counsel in all criminal cases in England, see RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF THE
ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW, 399-601.
In 1903, Parliament passed the Poor Prisoners Defense Act, 3 Edw. 7, c. 38, s.1
(1903), which empowered the judges "to appoint a solicitor and a counsel in all in-
dictments when the defendant's means were insufficient to enable him to obtain
counsel, and when it appeared from the nature of the defense, as disclosed in evi-
dence given or statements made before the committing magistrates, that justice
required such an appointment." See HALISBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND Pt. v, Par. 684
(1909).
Because this act required the defendant to disclose his evidence, and made it
virtually discretionary with the magistrate to appoint counsel, the defendant's
rights were not well protected. See ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST
TO APPEAL 363-64 (1947). Parliament partially responded to this problem with the
adoption of the Poor Prisoner's Defense Act, 20 and 21 Geo. 5, c. 32 (1930), which
required that a defendant charged with murder be defended by appointed counsel,
and permitted discretionary appointment of counsel in the case of other felonies,
when "by reason of the gravity of the charge or of exceptional circumstances, jus-
tice requires such an appointment." Id. s. 2; later repealed by 12 and 13 Geo. 6, Pt.
II, s. 18 (2) (a) (1949). See JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 123-
125, and 253 (1940), for a discussion of the unsatisfactory results under the 1930
act.
In 1949, Parliament modified only slightly the Poor Prisoner's Defense Act when
it passed the Legal Aid and Advice Act of 1949, which required that any doubts
about whether justice required the appointment of counsel under the 1930 Act be
resolved in favor of the defendant, and provided for pre-arraignment application
for appointed counsel by the defendant. 12 and 13 Geo. 6, c. 51 (1949). See also
Smith, The English Legal Assistance Plan, 35 A.B.A.J. 453 (1949), which examines
the primarily civil nature of this act.
The right to counsel varied in Colonial America. 27 Penn-
sylvania, Delaware and South Carolina, recognized this right to
the extent that it was available, upon request, to one accused of a
capital offense. 28 Connecticut went even further.29 Virginia and
Rhode Island merely had a statutory privilege, based upon judi-
cial discretion.30 In the remainder of the Colonies, it appears that
the English procedure prevailed.3 1 During the post-revoluntion-
ary period, most states statutorily provided for the right to coun-
27. There are two views as to the influence of the English Common Law, rela-
tive to Colonial American Law.
The first group limits its effect to the post-revoluntionary period. See GOEBEL
and NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK, (1944). The thesis of
this group is that the frontier character of early America caused it to develop a
body of law much different than that found in England.
The second group holds that there was a deliberate and conscious effort to
transplant the English law into the colonies. Id.
28. BEANEY, supra note 23, at 16-17. Pennsylvania's Frame of Government of
1683 stated: "IAIl1 persons of all persuasions may ... personally plead their own
cause themselves, or if unable, by their friend .. " Id. Par. VI. In the Charter of
Privilege of 1701, it was guaranteed that "all criminals shall have the same privi-
leges of Witnesses and Counsel as their Prosecutors." Id. Para. V (1701).
Later, a 1718 statute in effect provided for assigned counsel, stating that "upon
all trials of the said capital crimes, lawful challenges shall be allowed, and learned
counsel assigned to the prisoners." 3 Stat. 199 (1718).
Delaware, in its 1701 charter provided that "all criminals shall have the same
Privileges of Witnesses and Counsel as their Prosecutors." Art. 1 § 5. Also, a stat-
ute of 1709 provided for the appointment of counsel in cases of capital offenses. I
LAWS OF DELAWARE, 1700.1797 at 66 (1797).
South Carolina, in 1731, gave one accused of a capital offense the "right to make
his and their full defense, by council learned in the law . . . [11n case any person
shall desire counsel, the court is required ... to assign counsel ... " XIII LAWS
OF THE PROVINCE OF SOUTH CAROLINA at 518-519 (1736).
29. Id. at 16. 1818 marked the first statutory provision for the right to counsel
in Connecticut. As of 1750 there had existed a very broad, judicially imposed right
to counsel when the accused asked for it, after being first informed of his right to
ask. Counsel was also appointed, even in the absence of request, when the ac-
cused was handicapped in some manner. 2 SwIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF CON-
NECTICUT 392 (1795).
30. Id. at 17. In Virginia, an act passed in 1734 permitted the accused in all
capital cases to defend by counsel upon request to the court. The courts, however,
interpreted it to mean little more than did the English practice, which permitted
counsel to argue points of law. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA at 76-
80 (1930).
A Rhode Island Act of March 11, 1660, expressed the right of counsel as follows:
"Whereas it doth appears that any person ... may on good grounds, or through
malice and envy be indicted and [accused] may be innocent, and yet, may not be
accomplished with so much wisdom and knowledge of the law as to plead his own
innocency. Be it therefore inacted ... that it shall be accounted and owned from
henceforth.., the lawful privilege of any man that is indicted, to procure an at-
torney to plead any point of law that may make for the clearing of his innocency."
II RHODE ISLAND COLONIAL RECORDS 1664-77 at 239 (Bartless, 1857).
31. Id. at 14. Exhaustive studies of colonial New York and Virginia indicate
that the right to counsel in those states was no greater in actual practice than in
England. GOEBEL and NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENTS IN COLONIAL NEW YORK at
574 (1944). See also Scott, supra note 30 at 76-80.




There was little discussion on either the state or the federal
32. Id. 18-20. Georgia had no provisions in its 1776 Constitution concerning
counsel; however, English procedure had been followed since at least 1754. 1
GRICE, THE GEORGIA BENCH AND BAR 40 (1931).
The recognition of the right to defend by counsel was stated in the Constitution
of 1798: "No person shall be detained from advocating or defending his cause
before any court or tribunal, either by himself or counsel or both." GA. CONST. art.
III, § 8.
Virginia had no provisions in the Constitution of 1776, and has failed to include
any in its later constitutions. The Bill of Rights of the Constitution of 1776, how-
ever, does state, in effect, that prosecutions should be in accordance with the "law
of the land." However, in 1786 Virginia enacted a statute which allowed the ac-
cused to retain counsel to assist him at the trial. XII STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIR-
GINiA 343 (Hening, 1823).
South Carolina, in its Constitution of 1778, Par XLI, required that criminal pro-
ceedings be in accordance with the "[Iaw of the land."
North Carolina had no constitutional clause regarding counsel until 1868. An act
of 1777, however, declared that "[elvery person accused of any crime or misde-
meanor whatsoever, shall be entitled to counsel, in all matters which may be nec-
essary for his defense as well as the facts as to law." XCIV LAWS OF NORTH
CAROLINA 317 (Iredell, 1791).
The Delaware Constitution of 1716 stated that all acts and statutes in force were
to continue. DEL. CONST. art. 24, (1776). This maintained the previously estab-
lished right to retain counsel in all felonies less than capital, and the right to have
counsel appointed in capital cases. The Constitution of 1792 provided: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused hath a right to be heard by himself and his
counsel." DEL. CONsT. art. I, § 7, (1972).
In the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, the right previously enjoyed, contin-
ued. PENN. CONST. DEC. OF RIGHTS IX (1776).
The New York Constitution of 1777, Par. XXXIV, simply stated: "in every trial
or impeachment for crimes or misdemeanors, the party impeached or indicted
shall be allowed counsel, as in civil actions."
New Jersey, which had previously had no statutory provision, extended a guar-
antee that "all criminals shall be admitted to the same privileges of witnesses and
counsel, as their prosecutors are, or shall be entitled to." Par. XVI. Apparently
this was not deemed sufficient and, later, an act of 1795 required the courts in all
cases of indictment "to assign to such person, if not of ability to procure:counsel,
such counsel, not exceeding two, as he or she shall desire." ACTS OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, 1791-96, p. 1012.
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 guaranteed that "every subject shall
have a right to ... be fully heard in his defense by himself or his counsel, at his
election." MAss. CONST. pt. I, art. XII.
The Maryland Constitution of 1776 held that "In all criminal prosecutions, every
man hath a right . . . to be allowed counsel . " MD. CoNsT. DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS, XIX. (1780).
The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 stated that "every subject shall have a
right ... to be fully heard in his defense by himself, and counsel." NH. CONST., pt.
I, art. XV, (1784). An act of 1791 provided that one indicted for crimes punishable
by death "shall at this request have counsel learned in the law assigned: him by
the court, not exceeding two, and ... shall have liberty to make his full defense
by counsel and by himself ... ." LAws OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 247 (1972).
The Independent Republic of Vermont in its Constitution of 1777 declared sim-
level regarding the inclusion of a right to counsel in the national
Constitution,33 even though there had been considerable debate
on several other of the proposed amendments. Apparently, the
states were satisfied with existing procedures in this area and as-
sumed that criminal prosecution would remain, primarily, a state
function.34 Because of the absence of discussion surrounding the
adoption of the sixth amendment "right to counsel", the courts
were left with the responsibility to define the scope of this right.35
B. The Right of Counsel from 1789 to 1938
Even though the scope of right to counsel under the sixth
amendment was ultimately left to judicial pronouncements, it
cannot be said that Congress was silent on the subject. Two acts
were passed during the early part of this period which were rele-
vant to the right of counsel in certain situations. The first, the Ju-
diciary Act of 1789,36 was signed by President Washington the day
before the sixth amendment was proposed in both Houses of Con-
gress. 3 7 This act stated in relevant part:
[I]n all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead and man-
ply that "in all prosecutions for criminal offenses, a man hath a right to be heard,
by himself and his counsel. ... VT. CONST., Chap. I, para. X (1777).
33. The only two states to propose, at their ratification conventions, a right to
counsel were Virginia and North Carolina. Virginia proposed that: "In all criminal
and capital prosecutions, a man hath a right to . . . be allowed counsel in his
favor .... 3 ELLIOTr, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 658 (1901). North
Carolina copied the proposal of Virginia. Id., v.6, at 243.
Madison introduced, in the first session of Congress on July 2, 1789, a series of
amendments, one of which provided that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right. . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense" as part
of article I, Sec. 9. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 440 (Gales & Seaton ads. 1789).
There was extensive debate on such proposals as the basis of representation, re-
ligious freedom, freedom of speech and press, election of representatives, and the
right to bear arms, yet there was virtually no discussion surrounding the right to
counsel proposals. Id., at 747-96.
34. This lack of comment could best be attributed to the thinking at the time
that the criminal process would remain primarily a state responsibility. CUMMINGS
and MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 464-75 (1937).
35. See BEANEY, supra note 23, at 24, where it was observed, "it is extremely
difficult, if not impossible with the available material to reach any positive conclu-
sion concerning the intention of Congress in proposing the clause of the interpre-
tations given it by the states at the time of ratification. Lack of discussion usually
means that there is general agreement, but in view of the varying statutory and
judicial practices in the states, the question may well be asked, to what did the
states agree? Each state could accept the proposal as guaranteeing a right similar
to that which the citizen already possessed against this own state government.
But whether an individual would be allowed to interpret it to mean more than the
right to retain counsel would depend on the state in which he resided. It was left
to the courts to decide the scope of the clause, with a minimum of guidance from
the events and the comments accompanying its adoption."
36. 1 STAT. 73 § 35 (1789).
37. The Judiciary Act of 1789 was signed by Washington on Sept. 25. BEANEY,
supra note 23.
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age their own causes personally or by the assistance of such counsel or
attorneys at law as by the rules of said court . . . shall be permitted to
manage and conduct causes therein.38
The second statute, passed on April 30, 1790,39 seven months prior
to the ratification of the sixth amendment stated,
Every person who is indicted of treason or other capital crime, shall be al-
lowed to make his full defense by counsel learned in the law; and the
court before he is tried, or some judge thereof, shall immediately, upon his
request, assign to him such counsel not exceeding two, as he may desire,
and they shall have access to him at all reasonable hours.
40
The sixth amendment and the two acts of 1789 and 1790, repre-
sented the extent of legislative and judicial pronouncement on
the right to counsel until 1938.41 During the period prior to 1938
several cases had touched upon the problem, yet were decided on
other grounds. Anderson v. Treat,42 for example, dealt with a situ-
ation in which the trial judge severed the co-defendants, due to a
conflict of interest, and appointed separate counsel for Treat.
Treat, however, desired representation by the one counsel re-
tained by all co-defendants. The judge's action was upheld on the
technical grounds that habeas corpus could not be used to attach
the judgment and, even if it could, petitioner had not timely ob-
jected to the appointment of counsel.43
38. 1 STAT. 73 § 35 (1789).
39. 1 STAT. 73 § 35 (1790).
40. Id. Apparently, this statute placed the right to counsel in federal courts on
the same basis as Delaware, Pennsylvania and South Carolina, where the consti-
tution merely gave the right "to be heard by counsel."
The ratification of the sixth amendment was not followed by statutory changes,
and the acts of 1789 and 1790 remained as the sole guides to the meaning of the
sixth amendment until 1938.
41. Federal courts developed a practice of appointing counsel in non-capital
cases, pursuant to their inherent power over court procedures and officers. Holtz-
off, Right to Counsel under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1 (1944).
42. 172 U.S. 24 (1898). On his own motion, the trial judge had severed the de-
fense of co-defendants upon discovering a conflict of interests and had appointed
counsel for Treat, who wished to be defended by the one counsel retained by all
defendants. The Supreme Court upheld this appointment on the ground that
habeas corpus could not be used to attack the judgment, but implied that on the
merits of the case it would have rejected the petitioner's claim, because no timely
objection to the appointment of counsel was shown. Id. at 30-31.
43. Other pre-1938 cases dealt with equally peripheral aspects of the right to
counsel issue: United States v. Philadelphia and Reading Ry. Co., 268 F. 697 (E.D.
Pa. 1916) (filing fee for appearance by counsel held not violative of right to coun-
sel); Paschen v. United States, 70 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1934) (practice of Federal
Judges to personally conduct voir dire examination of jury not contra right to
counsel); Urban v. United States, 46 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1931) (counsel absent
during empaneling of jury, not violative of right to counsel whereas counsel ac-
cepted panel upon his return); Hogan v. United States, 9 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1925)
(withdrawal of one of several counsel immediately before motion for new trial, in-
The Supreme Court, in the 1938 case of Johnson v. Zerbst,44 is-
sued its first opinion wherein the right to counsel guarantee of the
sixth amendment was articulated and defined. Two marines on
leave had been arrested, convicted and sentenced to four and one-
half years in prison for counterfeiting. They petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus and a hearing was held before a Georgia federal
district court. The basis for the Marines' petition was the failure
of the trial court to offer counsel or to advise them of their right to
have court appointed counsel. The United States Supreme Court
held: "The Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all
criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an ac-
cused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance
of counsel. '45
VI. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN STATE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS4 6
A. Powell v. Alabama47
The United States Supreme Court, in Powell, faced the ques-
violative of right to counsel where remaining counsel saved an exception to the
court's ruling); see also Smith v. United States, 288 F. 259 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (counsel
appointed by court in order to avoid further delay after numerous postpone-
ments); In re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467 (D. Md. 1934) (counsel injected himself into a
criminal proceeding); and Dillingham v. United States, 76 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1935)
(counsel who voluntarily aided indigent must have rendered sufficient assistance
to afford defendant a fair trial).
44. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
45. Id. at 463. The precedents for Johnson were as follows: Frank v. Mangum,
237 U.S. 309, 345-50 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting), stated that Supreme Court
must look beneath the record where judge and jury had been intimidated. Moore
v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923), where due process was held to have been violated
when the trial was reduced to a sham, due to the obviously passion-induced con-
viction. Downer v. Dunaway, 53 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1931). Fear induced by a series
of mob attacks caused the defense attorney to fail to move for continuance, change
of venue, motion for new trial after judgment; therefore, habeas corpus could is-
sue. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Counsel must be assigned when de-
fendant is unable to employ counsel, is incapable of self-defense due to ignorance,
feeblemindedness, illiteracy, etc. pursuant to due-process. Patton v. United States,
281 U.S. 276 (1930). Waiver of jury trial required to be express and intelligent.
In 1931 the American Law Institute submitted to its members and to the legal
profession a code which placed upon the judge the duty of appointment of counsel
at arraignments for accuseds of felonies who needed counsel and were without it.
However, any defendant might and should procure his own counsel, if possible.
A.L.I. Code of Criminal Procedure (Official Draft) (1930) § 209.
46. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
47. Sutherland observed that, in contrast to the ideas espoused by Coke, the
judge cannot adequately represent the interests of the accused:
[H]ow can a judge, whose functions are purely judicial, effectively
discharge the obligation of counsel for the accused? He can and should
see to it that in the proceedings before the court, the accused shall be
dealt with justly and fairly. He cannot investigate the facts, advise and
direct the defense, or participate in those necessary conferences between
counsel and accused which sometimes partake of the inviolable character
of the confessional.
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tion of whether a federally guaranteed right of counsel existed in
state criminal proceedings. In setting aside the criminal convic-
tions of eight youths sentenced to death, because of the absence
of appointed counsel, the Court held that due process under the
fourteenth amendment had been violated.
The due process right of counsel, enunciated by Powell, was
much narrower than the sixth amendment right of counsel later
articulated in Johnson. The due process standard was based on
the presence of "special circumstances" requiring appointed
counsel:
[where the defendant] is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable ade-
quately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-minded-
ness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or
not, to assign counsel for him as a necessity of due process of law .... 48
The factors triggering this due process right of counsel were sum-
marized as follows:
[T] he ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the circum-
stances of public hostility, the imprisonment and close surveillance of the
defendants by the military forces, the fact that their friends and families
were all in other states and communication with them necessarily difficult,
the above all that they stood in deadly peril of their lives.49
287 U.S. at 61. Sutherland recognized the defendant could not represent his own
interests adequately because "even the intelligent and educated layman has small
and sometimes no skill in the science of law." Id. at 68-69. Moreover, said Suther-
land, the defendant
lacks both the skill and knowledge adequate to prepare his defense, even
though he has a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though, he be not
guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. Id. at 69.
48. 287 U.S. 45 at 71. Due process, Justice Sutherland further stated that due
process always required the observance of certain fundamental personal rights as-
sociated with a hearing and "the right to the aid of counsel is of this fundamental
character." This statement referred to the right to retain counsel of one's choice
and at one's expense. Id. 68-69.
49. Id. at 71. The courts were first to abandon the "special circumstances" test
in capital cases. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) held that right to counsel
is a constitutional mandate in such cases. The erosion of the special circum-
stances test in non-capital cases was completed in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
For earlier cases utilizing the "special circumstances" test see: Williams v. Kai-
ser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945); Tompkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945); Hawk v. Olson,
326 U.S. 271 (1945); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947); Marino v. Ragen,
332 U.S. 561 (1947); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
Prevalent prejudicial factors enunciated by the courts have been:
1. Youth. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Pennsylvania ex rel
Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S.
437 (1948); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561
(1947); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947).
B. Betts v. Brady5°
Betts raised the question of whether or not the broad meaning
of the right to counsel as provided in the sixth amendment ap-
plied to the states through fourteenth amendment due process.
The Court answered in the negative. It stated that the right of
counsel provided in the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment "formulate a concept less rigid and more fluid"51 than
that mandated by the sixth amendment.
The standard adopted in Betts was not unlike that adopted in
Powell. The Court reasoned that a state denial of the right of
counsel "might in certain circumstances" 52 be a denial of the due
process right to counsel when "the resulting conviction was so
lacking in 'fundamental fairness'" as to necessitate the imposi-
tion of a constitutional restriction upon a state prosecution.53
C. Gideon v. Wainwright54
Gideon, by a unanimous Court, overruled Betts and held that
one who is "hauled into Court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him."55 Justice Black, speaking for the majority, stated that the
right of counsel in felony trials was "fundamental" and, therefore,
constitutionally mandated in state courts by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 56
2. Inexperience. Moore, supra; Uveges, supra.
3. Mental Deficiency. Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954); Palmer v.
Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951).
4. Overreaching by Court or Prosecutor. Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773
(1949); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); Palmer v. Ashe, supra;
White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945).
5. Prejudicial Trial Events. Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633 (1959); Gibbs v.
Burke, supra; Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960); Chewning v.
Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962).
6. Prejudicial Sentencing Occurrences. Townsend v. Burke, supra.
50. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), rev'd. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
51. Id. at 461-462.
52. Id. at 462.
53. Id. at 471-473. Justice Black, in dissent, argued that the fourteenth amend-
ment made the sixth applicable to the states and, therefore, required the appoint-
ment of counsel. Id. at 474 (joined by Justices Douglas and Murphy).
54. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
55. Id. at 344.
56. Id. at 342-343, 344. Justice Black personally believed that the fourteenth
amendment made applicable against the states all provisions of the Bill of Rights.
See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), rev'd. Mal-
lory v. Hogan 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
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D. Argersinger v. Hamlin5 7
The Supreme Court, in Argersinger, held as irrelevant the
designation of an offense as either misdemeanor or felony when
determining whether a defendant is entitled to court appointed
counsel. The Florida Supreme Court had held that the right to
appointed counsel extended only to trials "for non-petty offenses
punishable by more than six months imprisonment. 58 The
Supreme Court reversed and, per Justice Douglas, stated: "Ab-
sent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be impris-
oned for any offense ... unless he was represented by counsel."5 9
The Court rejected the argument that there were too few attor-
neys to provide representation in misdemeanor cases where im-
prisonment was threatened.60 Justice Brennan, in his concurring
57. 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (the right to be represented by designated counsel in a
misdemeanor case where imprisonment might occur). See discussion infra.
The right of juveniles to designate counsel was recognized in In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967). See also Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 604 (1967).
58. The Florida Supreme Court, following the precedent established by
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) held the right to court-appointed
counsel extends only to trials "for non-petty offenses punishable by more than six
months state imprisonment." See ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442, 443
(Fla. 1970), rev'd sub nom., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). See also
Note, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3
CREIGHTON L. REV. 103 (1970).
Twelve states provided counsel for indigents accused of "serious crimes" in the
misdemeanor category. Id. at 119-124. Nineteen states provided for the appoint-
ment of counsel in most misdemeanor cases. Id. at 124-133. One of those is Ore-
gon, whose Supreme Court said: "If our objective is to insure a fair trial in every
criminal prosecution the need for counsel is not determined by the seriousness of
the crime. The assistance of counsel will best avoid conviction of the innocent-an
objective as important in the municipal court as in a court of general jurisdiction."
Stevenson v. Holtzman, 254 Ore. 94, 100-101, 458 P.2d 414, 418 (1969). The California
requirement extends to traffic violations. Blake v. Municipal Court, 242 Cal. App.
2d 731, 51 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1966).
Overall, 31 states have now extended the right to defendants charged with
crimes less serious than felonies. Id. at 134.
59. 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). Compare A.B.A. Project on Standards for Criminal
Justice, Providing Defense Services I (Approved Draft 1968). The A.B.A. observed
that "Counsel should be provided in all criminal proceedings for offenses punish-
able by loss of liberty, except those types of offenses for which such punishment is
not likely to be imposed, regardless of their denomination as felonies, misdemean-
ors or otherwise." Id. § 4.1 pp. 37-38.
60. 407 U.S. at 37. The opinion stated:
We do not share Mr. Justice Powell's doubt that the Nation's legal re-
sources are insufficient to implement the rule we announce today. It has
been estimated that between 1,575 and 2,300 full-time counsel would be re-
quired to represent all indigent misdemeanors, excluding traffic offenders.
Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev.
1249, 1260-1261 (1970). These figures are relatively insignificant when com-
opinion, stated that law students could serve a role in defending
these cases: "I think it plain that law students can be expected to
make a significant contribution, quantitatively and qualitatively,
to the representation of the poor in many areas, including cases
reached by today's decision." 6'
VII. SCOPE OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Generally
Culminating in Argersinger,62 the right of counsel has become
an absolute in all criminal prosecution where imprisonment is a
potential punishment, whether state or local. The scope of this
right is now very broad, and extends to such nontrial proceedings
as appeals and lineups. These proceedings are said to be "critical
stages" since substantive rights of the defendants may be affected
therein.63
pared to the estimated 355,200 attorneys in the United States (Statistical
Abstract of the United States, 153 (1971)), a number of which is projected
to double by the year 1985.
See Ruud, That Burgeoning Law School Enrollment, 58 A.B.A.J. 146, 147. Indeed,
there are 18,000 new admissions to the bar each year-3,500 more lawyers than are
required to fill the "estimated 14,500 average annual openings." Id. at 148.
61. 407 U.S. at 41.
62. Supra note 59.
63. Among the "critical stages" encountered by the courts are:
1. Pre-trial Proceedings: Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) supra
note 49 (arraignment where defense of insanity must have been asserted
or lost); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (guilty plea entered at pre-
liminary hearing); Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968) (making
both White, and Hamilton, supra, retroactive) and Coleman v. Alabama,
399 U.S. 1 (1970) (preliminary hearing wherein only issue was probable
cause);
2. Custodial Questioning:
a. Post Indictment. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (although
the opinion of the court reasoned that a confession was involuntary,
four justices reasoned that the confession abridged the defendant's
right to counsel because it was obtained in the absence of counsel);
Massiah v. United States, 337 U.S. 201 (1964) (post-indictment state-
ments of defendant, absent counsel and overheard by police using se-
cret broadcasting unit held violative of right to counsel).
b. Pre Indictment. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Compare
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) which placed the right to coun-
sel at this stage on the fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause.
For right to counsel cases dealing with custodial proceedings which
followed the "special circumstances" test of Powell, see Crooker v. Cal-
ifornia, 375 U.S. 433 (1958); and Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958),
rev'd Escobedo, supra at 491-492.
3. Identification Procedures: United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)
and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (in-court identification of de-
fendants based on out-of-court lineups absent counsel held inadmissable).
Compare Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (unnecessarily suggestive
lineups held violative of due process); and Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
(1972) (no right to counsel attaches to pre-indictment lineups because no
adversary criminal proceedings).
4. Post Conviction: Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (counsel
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Although the scope of the right of counsel is broad, the concept
of counsel itself is not so broad. The right of counsel under either
the sixth or fourteenth amendments is less than all-encompassing
and yet more than mere appointment of an attorney.
In Powell, the United States Supreme Court stated that inade-
quate representation may be equivalent to none at all. The right
to counsel was said to implicitly require that the legal assistance
be effective. 64 Powell and its progeny, however, failed to define a
standard by which the effectiveness of counsel was to be mea-
sured, leaving this determination to state and federal courts. As a
result, a number of standards have been formulated.
B. The Mockery of Justice Test
The decision in Diggs v. Welch 65 was overwhelmingly consid-
ered to embody the proper standard of effective representation in
both state and federal prosecutions until the mid-1960's. The
court in that case, held that a criminal conviction could be over-
turned if the incompetency of counsel resulted in a trial which
"shocked the conscience of the court and made the proceedings a
mandated at sentencing); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (hearing on
revocation of probation required presence of counsel). Due process and
equal protection, however, have been the primary vehicles by which the
right to counsel has been expanded beyond matters affecting sentencing.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (due process and equal protection pre-
vented state criminal procedure from favoring wealthy defendants); Doug-
las v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indigent defendant must have
counsel appointed on appeal when more affluent defendants are allowed
retained counsel); Gunsolus v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1971) (due
process mandated appointed counsel at parole revocation hearing); and
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (so-called "jail-house lawyers" could
not be prohibited from preparing writs of habeas corpus for fellow prison-
ers).
5. Non-Criminal Proceedings: Due process requires counsel in such
cases. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (commitment proceedings).
Compare In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957) (fire marshall investigation);
and Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959) (contempt of court of private
detectives who refused to testify).
64. Under Powell, due process in capital cases requires "effective representa-
tion." Id. at 71. See also Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940) wherein Justice
Black wrote for the majority:
"[TIhe denial of opportunity for appointed counsel to confer, to consult
with the accused and to prepare his defense, could convert the appoint-
ment of counsel into a sham and nothing more than a formal compliance
with the Constitution's guarantee of assistance of counsel cannot be satis-
fied by mere formal appointment." Id. at 453.
65. 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
farce and mockery of justice." 66 Currently, four circuits 67 and
nearly one-half of the states68 still adhere to this test.
C. The Reasonable Competency Standard69
In McMann v. Richardson, the United States Supreme Court
held that a guilty plea was "voluntarily and intelligently given"
only if it was based on "reasonably competent" 70 legal advice.
Reasonable competence was objectively defined as advice within
the "range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases." 7 1 McMann, although it dealt with the subject of guilty
pleas, set in motion an objective alternative to the subjective
"mockery of justice" standard.72 However, some courts, including
66. Id. at 670. In Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the court
said: "These words are not to be taken literally, but rather as a vivid description
of the principle that the accused has a heavy burden in showing the requisite un-
fairness." Id. at 116.
67. See Dunker v. Vinzant, 505 F.2d 503 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. Yan-
ishefsky, 500 F.2d 1327 (2nd Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Little v. Twomey, 447
F.2d 767 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1078 (1972)- Johnson v. United States, 380
F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1967).
The eighth circuit purports to use this standard but, in fact, actually applies the
"reasonable competency test." Supra note 51.
The District of Columbia circuit repudiated this standard in United States v.
DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
68. State v. Phillips, 16 Ariz. App. 174, 492 P.2d 423 (1972); Haynie v. State, 257
Ark. 542, 518 S.W.2d 492 (1975); Palmer v. Adams, 162 Conn. 316, 294 A.2d 297 (1972);
Parker v. State, 295 So. 2d 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); State v. Wozniak, 94 Idaho
312, 486 P.2d 1025 (1971); People v. Austin, 23 Ill. App. 3d 520, 319 N.E.2d 306 (1974);
Greer v. State, 321 N.E.2d 842 (Ind. 1975); Winter v. State, 210 Kan. 597, 502 P.2d 733
(1972); State v. Flanagan, 254 La. 100, 222 So. 2d 872 (1969); State v. LeBlanc, 290
A.2d 193 (Me. 1972); People v. Green, 42 Mich. App. 154, 201 N.W.2d 664 (1972);
State v. O'Neill, 299 Minn. 60, 216 N.W.2d 882 (1974); Parham v. State, 229 So. 2d 582
(Miss. 1969); State v. Noller, 142 Mont. 35, 381 P.2d 293 (1963); Warden v. Lischko,
90 Nev. 221, 523 P.2d 6 (1974); State v. Gillihan, 85 N.M. 514, P.2d 33 (1973); State v.
Sneed, 284 N.C. 606, 201 S.E.2d 867 (1974); State v. Peoples, 28 Ohio App. 2d 162, 162
N.E.2d 463 (1971); State v. Lewis, 255 S.C. 466, 179 S.E.2d 616 (1971); and Bonsal v.
State, 502 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1973).
69. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
70. Id. at 770.
71. Id. at 770-71.
72. This standard has been articulated in various ways:
1. "Reasonably effective assistance." See Hudson v. Alabama, 493 F.2d
171, 173 (5th Cir. 1974); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir.
1974). See also Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975).
2. "Reasonably competent assistance." See United States v. DeCoster,
487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
3. "Genuine and effective assistance." See Harris v. State, 293 A.2d 291
(Del. 1972) (genuine and effective legal assistance); Green v. Warden, 3
Md. App. 266, 238 A.2d 920 (1968) (genuine and effective legal assistance);
State v. Goode, 84 S.D. 369, 171 N.W.2d 733 (1969) (adequate and effective
assistance).
4. "Conscientious and meaningful representation." See State v.
Desroches, 110 R.I. 497, 293 A.2d 913 (1972).
5. "A fair trial." See Thomas v. State, 516 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Mo. Ct. App.
1974); accord, In re Bousley, 130 Vt. 296, 292 A.2d 249 (1972) (fair and im-
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California's, have retained the "mockery of justice" standard
though they apply it more strictly.7 3
VIII. THE COURT OF APPEAL USE OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The court of appeal, applying the constitutional mandate as set
forth in Powell, Gideon, and Argersinger, declared that represen-
tation by a certified law student, in a felony prosecution, is uncon-
stitutional. The court's decision contained the exact wording
found in Argersinger: "Absent a knowing and intelligent waiver,
no person may be imprisoned for any offense . . .unless repre-
sented by counsel at his trial."7 4 Since the record was silent as to
whether or not the form signed by Mr. Perez was knowingly and
partial trial); State v. Robinson, 75 Wash. 2d 230, 233, 450 P.2d 180, 181-83
(1969); State v. Thomas, 71 Wash. 2d 470, 429 P.2d 231 (1967) (fair and im-
partial trial).
6. "Any reasonable basis" for counsel's actions. See Commonwealth ex
rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967) (some reason-
able basis). See also Taylor v. State, 291 Ala. 756, 287 So. 2d 901 (1973);
Rook v. Cupp, 17 Ore. App. 205, 526 P.2d 605 (1974).
73. California courts hold that a trial is a sham and farce whenever counsel's
incompetence affects a vital issue. People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34
Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963). See also People v. Thomas, 43 Cal. App. 3d 862, 118 Cal. Rptr.
226 (1974).
The Eighth Circuit modified the "farce and mockery" test. Cardarella v. United
States, 375 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1967). In McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir.
1974) the court stated: "Stringent as the 'mockery of justice' standard may seem,
we have never intended it to be used as a shibboleth to avoid a searching evalua-
tion of possible constitutional violations; nor has it been so used in this circuit."
Id. at 214. See also Johnson v. United States, 506 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975). The Eighth Circuit recently affirmed the "farce and
mockery" test in Sheril v. Wyrick, 524 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1975).
The courts are split over who has the burden of proof in a competency chal-
lenge, but most place it on the defendant. See, e.g., Hussick v. State, 19 Ore. App.
915, 529 P.2d 938 (1974); In re Bousley, 130 Vt. 296, 292 A.2d, 249 (1972); State v.
Thomas, 203 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1974). Some jurisdictions presume that members
of the bar are competent. See Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957); Kin-
dle v. State, 262 Ind. App. 199, 313 N.E.2d 721 (1974).
Other courts shift the burden to the state once defendant makes out a prima
facie case of incompetence. See United Stdtes v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204
(D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968). Other juris-
dictions require that the state prove competency beyond a reasonable doubt once
the defendant makes a prima facie case. See, e.g., Risher v. State, 523 P.2d 241
(Alas. 1974).
Almost every jurisdiction requires the incompetence to be prejudicial. See, e.g.,
McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974); Risher v. State, supra. This posi-
tion accords with the "harmless constitutional error rule." See Chapman v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1967); and Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 92 (1963).
74. Supra note 9, at 960.
intelligently made, the presumption 75 must be made that it was
not an intelligent waiver.76 Since there was not an intelligent
waiver and the court had already decided that Mr. Loo could not
be considered to be counsel,77 there remained only the question
of whether Mr. Zinter's presence would satisfy the constitutional
requirements. The court found that Mr. Zinter's participation did
not meet the constitutional requirements. 78 The court empha-
sized that right to counsel means more than the mere presence of
counsel. It entails that counsel act in a real, not perfunctory,
sense. "Zealous and active counsel ... in a substantial sense...
not pro forma" are the constitutional requirements that must be
met.79 The court of appeal decided that Mr. Zinter's participation
did not meet this level. 80 Consequently, neither Mr. Loo nor Mr.
Zinter provided effective representation. 81 In the absence of a
knowing and intelligent waiver, this constitutes reversible error
per se.82 The Supreme Court of the State of California vacated
the ruling of the court of appeal and granted a hearing on August
75. "This court may not presume from the silent record a voluntary and intelli-
gent waiver," supra note 9, at 963, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 41. See also Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238 (1969); Blake v. Municipal Court, 242 Cal. App. 2d 731, 51 Cal. Rptr. 771
(1966).
76. "Some rights will never be deemed waived unless the defendant is first ex-
pressly advised of their existence," Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 108, (1975)
(White, J., concurring). The right of assistance of counsel is such a right; Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); Walton v.
Arkansas, 371 U.S. 27 (1962).
77. The court makes a further argument. The federal constitutional right to
counsel is controlling; therefore the State of California legislature and/or judiciary
cannot fashion the practice of law to abrogate that or those rights: N.A.A.C.P. v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Sperry v. Florida, ex rel Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379
(1963); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
78. Supra note 9, at 965, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 43-44.
79. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1932). See also Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967).
80. Supra note 9, at 967, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
81. The court also briefly mentioned the question of moral standards since
this had been part of the basis for reversible error in Huckelberry v. State, 337 So.
2d 400 (Fla. 1967), stating that while a member of the Bar has been scrutinized and
accepted, a law student's "working knowledge of professional ethics is largely un-
known." Supra note 9, at 966, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 43. The court of appeal erred on
this point. Not only had Mr. Loo already passed the Professional Responsibility
exam at the time, but the Huckelberry case is distinguishable on its facts. In
Huckelberry, there had been direct fraud by a law school graduate who had not
passed the Bar and who had held himself out as a member of the Bar. The
Huckelberry case is further distinguishable in that a law school graduate posing as
an attorney had the defendant agree to a plea bargain on a murder charge. In
Perez, Mr. Loo had the assistance of practicing counsel, there was no fraud, and
there was a vigorous defense and cross-examination in the three day jury trial.
82. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); United States v. Dougherty, 473
F.2d 1113, 1127-1129 (D.C. Cir. 1972); People v. Ruiz, 263 Cal. App. 2d 216, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 473 (1968).
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16, 1978.83 On December 18, 1978 the court gave provisional ap-
proval to the State Bar rules governing the training of law stu-
dents.
IX. ARGUMENTS OF THE STATE FOR REVERSAL
The arguments on behalf of the state can be separated into two
components. First, there was no unauthorized practice of law.
Second, there was no sixth amendment violation of assistance of
effective counsel.
A. No Unauthorized Practice of Law
The state first contended that the State Bar "Rules Governing
Practical Training of Law Students" did not allow any authorized
practice of law.84 The test for what is the practice of law is not
where the action takes place, but rather whether advice and coun-
sel were given by one retaining independent judgment in the af-
fairs of the client.85
83. The hearing was granted on the following two issues: first, whether as a
matter of law a certified law student's representation, under the supervision of an
attorney, of a criminal defendant, impairs sixth amendment rights and, second,
whether the State Bar of California's Rules Governing Practical Training of Law
Students sanctions the unauthorized practice of law. Note that the California
Supreme Court has given provisional approval to these rules as of Dec. 18, 1978.
Infra note 95.
84. Rules Governing the Practical Training of Law Students, first adopted in
January, 1970, and amended most recently in May, 1976, provide as follows: "Rule
VI: Activities requiring direct supervision. (A) A student may engage in the fol-
lowing activities only if the client on whose behalf he acts shall approve in writing
the performance of such acts by such students or generally by any student and
then only with the approval, under the direct and immediate supervision and in
personal presence of the supervising lawyer .... (3) Appearing on behalf of the
client in any public trial, hearing or proceeding pertaining thereto in a court, or
tribunal or before any public agency, referee, commissioner, or hearing officer,
State or Federal, to the extent approved by such court, public agency, referee,
commissioner, or hearing officer .... (B) In all instances when, under these
Rules, a student is permitted to appear in any trial, hearing or proceeding, the stu-
dent shall, as a condition of appearance, first file with the court, tribunal, public
agency, referee, commissioner or hearing officer, a copy of the written approval of
the client required by Paragraph (A) of this Rule VI.
"Rule HI .... (B) (4) A student's eligibility to participate in activities under
these rules may be terminated by the Supreme Court or by the State Bar at any
time without a hearing and without any showing of cause." Provisionally ap-
proved Dec. 18, 1978 infra note 95.
85. People v. Merchant Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209 P. 363 (1922); Craw-
ford v. State Bar, 54 Cal. 2d 659, 7 Cal. Rptr. 746 (1960); People v. Strawder, 34 Cal.
App. 3d 330, 108 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1973); Farnham v. State Bar, 17 Cal. 3d 605, 552 P.2d
445, 131 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1976).
The law student, under the State Bar Rules, is never without
the supervision of a lawyer, and that attorney retains control and
responsibility for the case. 86 The judge or the attorney can ex-
cuse the law student at any time.87 Because of these limitations
on the certified law student, the state contended that it could not
be said that the student is dispensing or using independent legal
advice or judgment.
The specific facts of Perez lend themselves to a showing that
there was no unauthorized practice of law. The consent form
signed by Mr. Perez, Mr. Loo and Mr. Zinter was submitted to the
court.8 8 Mr. Zinter was present throughout the trial,89 and was ac-
tively involved in the defense.90 In short, the requirements of the
State Bar Rules were met.91
The question at this point, however, was whether or not the
State Bar Rules themselves were constitutional. The court of ap-
peal maintains that it is up to the judiciary to admit persons into
the practice of law, and that the legislature, via the State Bar, had
unconstitutionally invaded an area of judicial prerogative. 92 The
Supreme Court of California by way of its provisional approval of
the rules, has shown its disagreement with the reasoning of the
court of appeal on this point. While the issue might have had
merit eight years ago, the state and the amicus hold that it is now
a moot point. Over 11,788 students have had clinical experience
under the State Bar "Rules Governing the Practical Training of
Law Students." 93 In the last year alone, over 2,675 students have
been involved in clinical law.94 Certified law students have, under
supervision, performed trial work at all levels, including appear-
ances by certified law students before the California Supreme
Court.95 While the Supreme Court has not formally accepted the
86. Supra note 83, Rule V(C).
87. Supra note 83, Rule III (B)(4).
88. Supra note 9, at 956, 147 Cal. Rptr. 36-37.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Indeed, Mr. Zinter never relinquished control of the affairs of Mr. Perez.
Since he was the attorney of record, he had an ethical obligation to Mr. Perez to
see to it that the defense team represented Mr. Perez to the fullest extent of their
capabilities (see, e.g., ABA PROFESSIONAL CODE OF RESPONSIBILITY, E.C. 7 & D.R. 7-
101). Since there have been no allegations by Mr. Perez or findings by the court
that Mr. Zinter did not live up to those ethical obligations, it must be assumed that
Mr. Zinter acted in an ethical manner at the trial. Since part of those ethical obli-
gations included the highest degree of endeavor for the client, it may be assumed
that Mr. Perez was represented by counsel.
92. Supra note 9, at 959, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
93. Infra note 118, at 58.
94. Id.
95. Infra notes 117, 118, since representation by a certified law student has
never been an issue prior to Perez, "the record" is devoid of references to the sta-
tus of law students during court appearances.
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State Bar "Rules Governing the Practical Training of Law Stu-
dents,"96 it has acquiesced to them since 1970 and has provision-
ally accepted them on Dec. 18, 1978, and is now being asked by the
state to give its assent to a nunc pro tunc97 order.9 8
The state contended that Mr. Loo was not acting as an attorney,
as he did not exercise independent judgment or independently
give advice or counsel, but was acting within the scope of the
State Bar Rules. The Rules set forth by the California Bar are
well accepted, needed,99 and await only formal verification.
B. Question of Effective Assistance of Counsel
While the question of the unconstitutionality of the State Bar
Rules can be dealt with by a closer examination of the facts, the
sixth amendment question raised by court of appeal requires a
more in-depth analysis.
The basic error of the court of appeal was in the emphasis it
placed on form over substance, status over actions. The court
seized upon the fact that Mr. Loo was a law student'0 0 and rode it
into the constitutional graveyard. The question is not who was
counsel, but what did counsel do?101 However, before delineating
the exact scope of the sixth amendment right to counsel standard,
and determining whether that standard was met, it is important
to note that law students have traditionally been viewed in a
much different light in connection with the courts than have lay-
men. In Hachin v. Arizona, 0 2 it was stated that a "law student
becomes a member of the Bar upon entry." In Argersinger v.
Hamlin,10 3 Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, joined by Jus-
96. The court provisionally accepted the Rules Governing the Practical Train-
ing of Law Students on 18 Dec. 1978. The Daily Journal, Dec. 18, 1978 at 1, Cal. 4.
97. "Now for then." This phrase is applied to acts allowed to be done subse-
quent to the time when they should be done, with retroactive effect. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1218 (rev'd 4th ed. 1968).
98. For an indication of how the court might decide this question, see Bird,
Clinical Defense Seminar, 14 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 243 (1974).
99. See policy discussion that follows, infra notes 115 to 133 and accompanying
text.
100. Mr. Loo was at the time a graduate of University of California, Los Ange-
les, School of Law, had already taken the Bar, and was awaiting the exam results.
He is now a practicing attorney. Source: Telephone interview with Ellen Mayer,
Assistant Records Officer, UCLA School of Law, Jan. 11, 1979.
101. People v. Felder, 402 N.Y.S.2d 411, 413 (1978); Achtien v. Dowd 117 F.2d 989,
992 (7th Cir. 1941).
102. 389 U.S. 143, 147 (1967).
103. 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972).
tices Douglas and Stewart, specifically called for the help of law
students in the representation of indigents in the court room.1 0 4
Justices Powell and Rehnquist, concurring in result, supported
the concept, though they indicated some reservations as to its ac-
tual viability and as to the extent of its impact outside of locales
with law schools.10S The court has also cited with approval the in-
prison legal services by law students in Johnson v. Avery.106
As can be seen, the law student has explicitly been given a
place, albeit limited, in trial work. However, as stated earlier, the
question is not so much who is doing the representation, but
rather what level of representation is being given. The standard
in California 107 is the same as in the federal courts: that of
effective counsel.108 Mr. Perez had not claimed that his counsel
was ineffective.109 The trial judge had nothing but praise for Mr.
Loo at the termination of the trial.110 Additionally, it must be
remembered that Mr. Loo comprised only one-half of the defense
team. The leading half of the team, Mr. Zinter, participated ac-
tively throughout the proceeding. He interjected himself thirteen
times on the record,' handled the sentencing alone,"12 and pro-
vided a guiding hand for Mr. Loo.
104. Id. "Law students as well as practicing attorneys may provide an impor-
tant source of legal representation for the indigent. . . . Like the American Bar
Association's Model Student Practice Rules (1969), most of these regulations per-
mit students to make supervised court appearances as defense counsel in criminal
cases . . . I think it plain that law students can be expected to make a significant
contribution, quantitatively and qualitatively, to the representation of the poor in
many areas, including the case reached by today's decision." Id.
105. Id. at 57, note 21.
106. 393 U.S. 483, 495-496 (1969).
107. In re Saunders, 2 Cal. 3d 1033, 1041, 472 P.2d 921, 926, 83 Cal. Rptr. 633, 638
(1970).
108. Pinedo v. United States, 347 F.2d 142 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 382 U.S. 976
(1965); Tahl v. O'Connel, 336 F. Supp. 576 (S.D. Ca. 1971), af. 460 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1971); Barber v. Nelson, 451 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir.
1971). In re Saunders, 2 Cal. 3d 1033, 472 P.2d 921, 88 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1970); People v.
Brown, 26 Cal. App. 3d 825, 102 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1972); People v. Pinedo, 30 Cal. App.
3d 860, 106 Cal. Rptr. 743 (1973).
109. Supra note 9.
110. Supra note 8; pertinent parts: "Mr. Loo did what I consider . .. an out-
standing job and I thought a better job than some . . . full-fledged lawyers." It
might also be pointed out that Mr. Loo had won acquittals in his five previous out-
ings.
111. Id. Mr. Zinter's participation breaks down as follows: entered himself as
attorney of record (RT 2), was alone at sentencing (RT 180-192), voir dire (RT 5),
stipulated as to evidence (RT 26, 61, 113, 147, 168), objected to evidence (RT 50, 59),
initiated and joined in discussions at the bench (RT 145, a, b, 161), trial strategy
(RT 145 b), to rest (RT 148), not to poll the jury (RT 172). All cites to transcript
pages of Superior Court, Imperial County 4 Crim. No. 8753. It is of some interest to
note that in the court of appeal's first opinion (June 23, 1978), the court stated that
Mr. Zinter took no active part in the proceedings, and when the error was pointed
out, the court replaced the original phrase with "uttered a total of 36 words." Id.
112. Id. at 180-192.
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The state contended that Mr. Perez was represented by counsel
and that counsel was effective in its representation. The fact that
half of Mr. Perez's defense team was not yet a lawyer, but rather
part of that special niche in the legal profession created for law
students, goes to the form of defense and not to its substance.
C. The Court Erred in not Applying the Prejudicial Standard on
the Question of Effective Counsel
The court of appeal was mistaken in not requiring Perez to
prove that he was prejudiced by his representation. Mr. Perez
has never alleged that he suffered from ineffective representa-
tion.1 13 This, combined with the comments of the trial judge,
would seem to indicate that Mr. Perez's defense was within bar
standards.11 4 The court blurred the distinction between being de-
nied counsel of any kind and being denied "effective" counsel.
The former is reversible per se, whereas the latter is reversible
only upon a showing of prejudice.115 The Perez court seemed anx-
ious to promulgate new law, even at the cost of muddled interpre-
tations and selective application.
X. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
This discussion would not be complete without some mention
of the important social considerations which are brought forward
by People v. Perez.
A. The Court of Appeal's Decision Disrupts the Judiciary's Long
and Continuing Drive to Extend Legal Protection to All
For many years, the Supreme Courts of the United States and
of California have been pioneers in extending legal representa-
tion to the accused, to the indigent, and to others who tradition-
ally have not had adequate access to the courtroom.116 The court
113. Supra note 9.
114. Supra note 8.
115. Supra note 72.
116. While there are many cases to illustrate this point, reference here will be
limited to a few of the more well-known cases: Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932), (right to counsel in capital cases); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (denial of counsel at critical stage reversible error per se); Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), (right to counsel when liberty may be taken); Johnson
v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (right to counsel or legal material in prison); Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (overruled California's Supreme Court in stating
that defendant must have counsel and could not appear pro se).
has specifically recognized and welcomed the use of law students
to help meet the needs caused by this extension of court ap-
pointed legal representation." 7 The trend and intent of the courts
are obvious.
"[I]f the judgment is made final, the long arm of the court of ap-
peal's opinion will effectively cripple the status of clinical legal
education in California." 118 The clinical law programs in Califor-
nia that are affected by the court of appeal's decision are far-
reaching. Over 2,675 students were active in the program in 1978,
11,788 since 1970.119 To remove so many active participants from
the state judicial process can result in nothing but a reversal of
the positive trend established by the courts in extending legal
representation to all.
While the Perez court limits its decision on sixth amendment
grounds to student participation in representation of felony trials
only, 120 it would be constitutional error to be so misled.121 The
court of appeal, holding that the State Bar Rules are invalid be-
cause unconstitutionally extended, 22 would leave every law stu-
dent involved not only in actual trial work, but also in landlord-
tenant disputes, employee disability cases, child custody cases,
juvenile hearings, and all other areas of law where law students
have made and are making significant contributions, open to a
charge of unauthorized practice of law. 23 Furthermore, attorneys
endeavoring to help a law student in his or her practical training
would expose themselves to charges of malpractice and possibly
even to review by the State Bar's disciplinary committee.124 For-
tunately, the Supreme Court's provisional acceptance of the State
Bar "Rules Governing the Practical Training of Law Students"
will alleviate these damages to a significant extent, with the possi-
ble exception of the area of criminal defense, where the issue re-
mains unresolved. The court of appeal's decision not only flies
117. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483,
496 (1969); People v. Municipal Court, supra, note 94.
118. Amicus curiae brief for appellee, People v. Perez, 82 Cal. App. 3d 952, 147
Cal. Rptr. 40 (1978), to court of appeal for rehearing from Loyola Law Clinics by
Thomas Scully and McGeorge School of Law Clinics by Glendale Garfield.
119. Memorandum of the State Bar of California in Support of Request that the
State Bar of California Rules Governing the Practical Training of Law Students be
approved, Bar Misc. No. 4089, P. 58. Request provisionally granted Dec. 18, 1975,
supra note 95.
120. Supra note 9, at 63, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
121. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), would extend such a ruling at
least to misdemeanors.
122. Supra note 9, at 960, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
123. This is a misdemeanor which, because of its nature, could seriously affect
the student's chance of ever entering the profession, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 6030, 6044(d) (West 1961).
124. State Bar of California RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-101.
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into the face of a long pursued judicial goal but also has had and
will have a chilling effect on the relationship between the profes-
sional and law students.
B. The Effects of this Decision Will Severely Curtail Legal
Education in California and as a Result the People of
California Will Suffer
Since 1870, when the case method of learning was introduced at
Harvard, 125 one of the chief criticisms of legal education has been
the almost total exclusion of practical training.126 Into this void,
the clinical law program sprang successfully,127 with many an ac-
colade from the profession.128
The court of appeal's decision would significantly accentuate
the problem of the incompetent attorney in court. The question
has recently received widespread public attention, much of it
from within the profession itself.129 By denying the only "real
world" experience available to the California law student, the
court's opinion would seem to insure a more unfamiliar and
therefore a more incompetent neophyte attorney than previ-
ously.130 As more would-be attorneys pass the Bar,131 and these
new attorneys are without practical experience, the foreseeable
result is even a lower level of representation for that segment of
society that cannot withstand having their counsel err. Also, a
125. This method was introduced by Christopher Columbus Langdell.
126. Llewllyn, On What is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COL. L.
REV. 651 (1935); Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer School? 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907
(1933).
127. Ninety percent (90%) of ABA-approved schools have clinical law pro-
grams, Survey of Clinical Legal Ed. 1977-78, CLERP REPORTER.
128. Bellow & Johnson, Reflections on the USC Clinical Semester, 44 U.S.C. L.
REV. 664 (1971); Bird, The Clinical Defense Seminar: A Method for Teaching Legal
Process and Professional Responsibility, 14 SANrA CLARA L. REV. 246 (1976);
Wenke, My View From the Bench, Clinical Education for the Law Student, 292-305,
CLERP REPORTER (1973); Kaufman, Advocacy as Craft-Law School is More than
a Paper Chase, 60 A.B.A.J. 802 (1974).
129. Chief Justice Burger, Has the Time Come? 55 F.R.N. 119 (1972); Bazelon,
Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CINN. L. REV. 1 (1973); Kaufman, Does a
Judge Have a Right to Qualify Counsel? 61 A.B.A.J. 569 (1975). See also recent
statements made by Chief Justice Burger to British Bar Association in London
(1978).
130. Bazelon, supra note 128, at 13-14.
131. While the California Bar Exam is notorious for its failure rate, it does not
measure advocacy, or working knowledge of the courts. This defect will only be
accentuated if the meager practical training now received is curtailed or termi-
nated.
rise in malpractice, mistrials and appeals are foreseeable due to
neophyte attorneys, their heads brimming with "law" and empty
of experience, stumbling through the judicial process. Such can-
not be the desire of the courts or of the general public.
C. The Courts, as Guardians of the Profession Have a Duty to
Increase Legal Education, Not Decrease It
The courts have long been recognized as the supervising guard-
ians of the legal profession. 3 2 While the courts may delegate ad-
ministrative power affecting the profession to the State Bar, they
have always retained control.133
It should not be the policy of the court to shed the greatest ad-
vance in legal education in the last fifty years 3 4 without funda-
mentally sound reasons and careful consideration.
The impact of the decision reveals harmful results in several ar-
eas. First, the long-standing goal of the judiciary to extend repre-
sentation to all levels of our society has been set back
substantially by Perez. Second, the training of law students is re-
stricted substantially in scope, a fact which will cause a signifi-
cant reduction in the profession's overall level of competence.
Such a reduction will most certainly result in serious hardships
for the people of California. And finally, the court is beginning a
withdrawal from its long held position as guardian of legal educa-
tion, a withdrawal based upon insufficient reasons.
XI. CONCLUSION
The court of appeal in Perez not only failed to use the proper
standards on the question of adequacy of representation, but
stretched and construed the State Bar Rules and the history of
those rules beyond reasonable interpretation. The court seems to
have used a selective pen in its choice of facts and a selective
memory with regard to the choice of controlling law. The Perez




132. Brotsky v. State Bar, 57 Cal. 2d 287, 368 P. 697, 19 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1962); Bar-
ton v. State Bar, 209 Cal. 677, 289 P. 818 (1930); Brydonjack v. State Bar, 208 Cal.
439, 281 P. 1018; 66 A.L.R. 1507 (1929); People v. Turner, 1 Cal. 143 (1850).
133. In re Lavine, supra note 17, at 328, affd. Brotsky, supra note 131.
134. Supra note 16.
